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ABSTRACT  
Parallel team strategy has been widely adopted by high-tech industries in knowledge creation. In this research, we study the 
design of organizational incentives, including a fixed wage payment and an additional reward structure, for the parallel team 
strategy. We consider two types of parallel teams—collaborative and non-collaborative parallel teams. Proposing and 
investigating two types of organizational reward policies (individual and aggregate) for both collaborative and non-
collaborative parallel teams, we demonstrate the viability and characteristics of these policies and analyze the tradeoff 
between the number of parallel teams and their rewards. We show that collaboration in parallel teams is vital for obtaining 
maximal benefits. This research provides valuable insights for firms in employing parallel team strategy for knowledge 
creation. 
Keywords 
Collaboration, Incentives, Knowledge Creation, Parallel Team. 
INTRODUCTION 
Team has been considered as an effective organizational structure for all sorts of innovative activities. In a ground-breaking 
study of the practices of General Motors in 1943, Peter Drucker pointed out the effectiveness of team-based structures in 
organizations. As evidenced by numerous successful cases, team structures have been employed in many new projects. For 
example, Microsoft launched its brand-new gaming platform Xbox to compete with the popular PlayStaion 2 from Sony, 
within a short period of time by employing the team strategy. At Google, various teams are assembled to work on different 
projects, such as Google Documents, Google Health, and Google Checkout.  
There are many insightful perspectives on team composition. Drucker (1998) identifies three kinds of team as the 
baseball team, the football team, and tennis doubles team. Cohen and Bailey (1997) categorize teams in organizations into 
four types: work teams, parallel teams, project teams, and management teams. Katzenback and Smith (2005) suggest three 
types of teams: teams that recommend things, teams that make or do things, and teams that run things. Although they seem 
disparate, these papers shares similar notions on teams. For instance, a parallel team categorized by Cohen and Bailey (1997) 
is the same as a football team identified by Drucker (1998).  
Due to the increasingly complex nature of technologies, not only do firms have to adopt appropriate team structures, but 
also assemble multiple teams to collectively engage in a single R&D project. For instance, more than 200 programmers were 
involved at Microsoft to develop Windows 95 that contains more than 11 million lines of code (Cusumano and Selby, 1997). 
Therefore, firms are continuously seeking cost-effective strategies to manage and coordinate teams on innovative projects.  
Different team strategies have been employed by industries for innovation and research. Concurrent team strategy has 
been widely adopted to shorten the development time of new products. For instance, project managers at Microsoft usually 
divide a project into parts with respect to its features. Teams then work simultaneously on their parts but they synchronize 
with each other and debug daily (Cusumano, 1997). In contrast, with the parallel team strategy, all teams work on a same 
research project simultaneously so as to maximize the overall success rate of the project. Parallel team strategy is frequently 
applied in research where single-team strategy results in extremely high failure rates. For example, Nelson (1961) documents 
the adoption of parallel-path strategy in R&D by U.S. Air force. Similar parallel-path strategy was also recently used at 
National Institute of Health(NIH) to develop malaria vaccine. In contrast, in the traditional process of malaria vaccine 
development, when one approach failed, the effort died with it as well (Seiguer, 2002). In this paper, we study how the 
parallel team strategy can be employed in knowledge creation. In particular, how should a firm choose the optimal number of 
teams to work on research simultaneously and how to reward the teams?  
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There exists a plethora of research on teams in economics, organizational science, and IS literature. Classical principal-
agent models explore the optimal incentive structure under incomplete information and the relationship between first best and 
second best solutions (Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Spence, 1973). Theory of teams (Marshak and 
Radner, 1972) requires different incentive systems (Groves, 1973; Holmstrom, 1982; McAfee and McMillan, 1991). 
Knowledge creation in firms follows dynamic processes (Nonaka, 1994) with different strategies (Liebeskind, 1996). 
However, only a few studies have analyzed the economic implications of parallel team strategies (Arditti and Levy, 1980; 
Dutta and Prasad, 1996). Besides, these studies do not discuss how to design necessary incentives to increase the success rate 
of a research project in conjunction with the optimal number of teams. In addition, the collaboration in teams that affects the 
success rate of innovation has never been modeled before. Our research bridges this gap by analyzing the critical role of 
collaboration and incentives for applying the parallel team strategy. Specifically, we address the following research questions 
in this paper.  
First, how does the optimal number of teams and reward policies differ between collaborative and non-collaborative 
parallel teams? Multiple parallel teams can be formed as either non-collaborative or collaborative parallel teams similar to 
the differentiation between working groups and teams by Katzenback and Smith (2003): non-collaborative teams is loosely 
bounded together for some common goals, whereas collaborative teams coalesce because of the collaboration among them. In 
particular, non-collaborative teams work independently without learning from or sharing with other teams, whereas 
collaborative teams work closely together so as to effectively increase the success rate of the research project. We study 
whether and how the presence of collaboration in parallel teams helps a firm to design better incentive contracts to achieve 
maximal benefits.  
Second, how should a firm design incentive contracts for parallel research teams to induce them to exert their best 
efforts? The incentive contracts for a team in this research consist of a fixed wage payment and an additional reward policy. 
All the teams get the fixed payment no matter whether they will succeed in research and they will be rewarded additionally if 
their research project succeeds. Two types of reward policies (individual and aggregate) are proposed in this paper and 
analyzed as to how these rewards should be designed to induce the best efforts from teams so that the firm may achieve 
maximal profit.  
Finally, how many parallel teams should a firm employ for knowledge creation? Prior research studied the optimal 
number of parallel teams, but without the incentive issues. This research makes the significant extension by investigating the 
optimal number of parallel teams while taking into account the incentives to motivate the best efforts.  
The paper proceeds as follows. §2 outlines our model. §3 presents the detailed analysis and discussion. §4 provides 
managerial insights and concludes the paper.  
MODEL 
In this section, we present a model in which a firm designs optimal incentives for parallel team strategy. Beginning with the 
individual team’s decision problem under the individual team reward policy, we then show the organizational decision 
problem. Finally, we derive a simplified model for analysis.  
We consider a firm that wishes to employ multiple parallel teams to engage in a research project for knowledge creation. 
Each team, acting independently, exerts a certain level of effort, generating a success rate for the research project. In our 
model, the team is considered a unit of analysis. The specifics of how the collective effort is distributed within the team and 
how the team is composed of are discussed in a different research paper. In addition, we assume all the teams are 
homogeneous with respect to their abilities in research.  
The firm chooses M  number of parallel teams and offers a payment structure that consists of two parts: a fixed wage 
payment w  and an additional reward r . The payment for individual team reward policy can be modeled as  
 
unsuccessful teams
individual policy
successful teams
w
w r
,
=
+ .



 
 
Under the individual policy, a team i ’s expected net payoff is  
 ( ) ( )Ii i iw c e e M rπ ρ= − + , ⋅ ,  (1) 
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where ie  is its effort exerted , ( )ic e  is the cost of effort, and ( )
I
ie Mρ ,  is the individual team’s probability of success rate 
which will be discussed in details later on.  
Accordingly, the firm’s net payoff is  
 ( ) ( )
M
G I
i
i
E M B M w e M rπ ρ ρ= , − ⋅ − , ⋅ ,∑  (2) 
in which E  is a vector containing all parallel teams’ efforts, B  is the benefit of the research project, and ( )G E Mρ ,  is the 
group success rate of all the teams.  
 
Parameters 
B  benefit of research 
( )Iρ ⋅  individual team success rate 
( )Gρ ⋅ group success rate of all teams 
rU  reservation utility 
Decision Variables 
e  team effort 
M  number of teams 
r  individual team reward 
R  aggregate team reward 
w  fixed wage payment 
Table 1. Summary of Notation 
 
Formally, the firm’s problem [ ]P  can be defined as  
 
w M r
max π
, ,
,  (3) 
subject to  
 
Equilibrium set
0
p r
E E
U
w
π
∗∈ ,
≥ ,
≥ ,
 
where the first constraint is the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC) for teams in which E∗  is the equilibrium set of effort 
among M  teams, the second constraint is the individual-rationality constraint (IR) in which rU  is the reservation utility, 
and the last one is to ensure a positive wage payment (see Table 1 for the complete list of notations). When the aggregate 
reward policy is applied, all the teams will equally share an aggregate reward R  when the research succeeds; the individual 
team’s payoff and firm’s profit can be formulated accordingly.  
We conduct our analysis in the next section for different scenarios: (1) for non-collaborative and collaborative parallel 
teams; (2) for individual or aggregate team reward policy.  
For a team in a non-collaborative setup, individual team success rate does not correlate with the total number of teams. 
Hence, the individual team success rate can be defined as ( ) ( )I e M eρ ρ, = , which is independent of the total number of 
teams M . Then the group team success rate is just ( ) 1 (1 ( )) 1 (1 ( ))G I M Me M e M eρ ρ ρ, = − − , = − − .  It is assumed 
that 
2( )(1 ( )) [ ( )] 0e e eρ ρ ρ′′ ′− + ≤ .  
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For a team in a collaborative setup, individual team success rate depends on the total number of teams. Due to the 
collaboration among all the parallel teams, individual team success rate may increase when more teams engage in research. In 
this regard, we define the individual team success rate as 
( )
( ) 1 (1 ( ))
q M
MI e M eρ ρ, = − − ,  then the group team success rate 
will be 
( )( ) 1 (1 ( )) 1 (1 ( ))G I M q Me M e M eρ ρ ρ, = − − , = − − ,  where ( )q M measures the degree of collaboration 
among M  teams. When ( )q M M= , there is no collaboration among teams, which is the same as the above case for a 
group of teams. When ( )q M M> , there is collaboration among teams, which helps to improve individual team success 
rate ( )I e Mρ , . When ( )q M M< ,the total number of teams will have opposite and negative effect on individual team 
success rate, which eventually reduces individual team success rate ( )I e Mρ , . In general, we assume that ( )q M  is a 
concave function, first increasing then decreasing in M  with the properties that (0) 0q =  and (1) 1q = .  
We next introduce two lemmas, which greatly simplifies the firm’s problem.  
 
Lemma 1.  There always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of teams’ effort levels when the individual reward policy is 
applied.  
Proof. Please see Appendix A.    
 
Lemma 2.  The individual-rationality constraints are always binding for each team.  
Proof. Please see Appendix B.    
 
Following upon Lemma 1, we simplify the notation ie  as e  for all the individual team effort levels under the individual 
reward policy and the incentive-compatibility constraint is thus reduced into  
 { ( ) ( ) }I
e
e argmax w c e e M rρ∈ − + , .
%
% %  
 
Lemma 2 lets us further reduce the firm’s problem with individual reward policy into  
 
( )
[ ( ) ] ( )Gr
r M
max M c e U e M Bπ ρ
,
= − + + ,  
subject to  
 
{ ( ) ( ) }
( ) ( ) 0
I
e
I
r
e e c e e M r
c e e M r U
ρ
ρ
′∈ | = , ,
− , + ≥ .
%
% % %
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This section details our analysis on parallel teams. First, we discuss the optimal solution for non-collaborative teams with 
individual reward policy. Second, we explore various conditions focusing on the team elasticity of collaboration for 
collaborative teams. Finally, the impacts of aggregate team reward policy are investigated on the equilibria of teams’ effort 
levels.  
 
Non-collaborative teams  
For non-collaborative teams, we show in the next proposition that the firm can only achieve the second-best solution by not 
offering any fixed wage payments to teams because of the lack of collaboration in teams.  
Proposition 1.  The firm cannot achieve the first-best solution for non-collaborative teams and the second-best reward and 
optimal effort level can be determined from  
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( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
r
c e
r
e
e
U c e c e
e
ρ
ρ
ρ
′
=
′
′= − .
′
 
Proof. Please see Appendix C.    
 
The reason that the first-best solution cannot be achieved in non-collaborative teams lies in the contradiction that the 
firm cannot obtain a positive profit while maintaining a positive wage payment. Figure 1 explains this intuition by showing 
individual team’s iso-utility wage contours and the firm’s indifference curve when there is no collaboration in parallel teams.  
 
 
Figure 1. Team’s iso-utility wage contours and firm’s indifference curve: no collaboration 
 
Since individual team’s effort level is solely determined by ( ) ( )c e e rρ′ ′/ = , which is not related to the number of 
teams M . Then, 0dr dM/ = , which implies that iso-utility wage contours are horizontal lines. Figure 1 shows these lines 
for the reservation utility rU . The firm’s substitution rate is  
 
( ) ( ( ) )
( ( ) ) ( )
G G e
M eM M
G e
er r
B w e r B M e rdr
dM B M e r M e
π
π
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
′− − + −
= − = − ,
′− −
 
which is zero at point ( )M r∗ ∗,  that satisfies the following two conditions  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
G
M r
G
e
B w e r c e U
B M e r Mc e
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
= + = + ,
′ ′= = .
 
These two conditions suggest that the optimal effort level e∗  is characterized by  
 
( )( )
( ) (1 ( )) (1 ( ))
rc e Uc e
e e ln eρ ρ ρ
∗∗
∗ ∗ ∗
′ +
= .
′ ′ ′− − −
 
When the wage payment is zero, individual team’s effort level can be obtained from  
 
0 0
0 0
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
rc e c e U
e eρ ρ
′ +
= .
′
 
Since (1 ( )) (1 ( )) ( ) 0e ln e e eρ ρ ρ′ ′− − − < ,∀ > , it follows that 0e e
∗ > , or 0r r
∗ > , which implies that the firm’s 
indifference curve for maximal profit can never intersect with individual team’s iso-utility wage contours for utility rU . 
Therefore, the firm can only achieve the second-best solution by lowering r∗  to 0r , offering zero wage payment to 
individual teams. M ∗  remains unchanged in both first-best and second-best cases. In summary, in a group of teams, the firm 
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cannot achieve the first-best effort levels from teams. The second-best effort levels can be obtained by paying teams a 
proportion of the research benefit under certain conditions.  
 
Collaborative Teams 
Having illustrated the firm’s second-best solution to a group of teams, we next turn our attention to the incentive design and 
the optimal number for collaborative teams.  
Individual reward policy 
In this section, we demonstrate that for collaborative teams, the firm may achieve a first-best solution under some conditions 
(see Appendix D for the lagrangian function of the firm’s profit). We first define and investigate the complementarity 
between the effort level e  and the total number M of teams, then propose the concept of team elasticity of collaboration, 
and finally characterize the conditions to obtain the first-best and second-best solutions.  
The complementarity is defined as the relation between the effort level and the number of teams with respect to their 
contribution to the firm’s total expected profit. If 
2 0e Mπ∂ /∂ ∂ = , there exists no complementarity between e  and M , 
which means that the effort level is independent of the total number of teams; if 
2 0e Mπ∂ /∂ ∂ > , there exists positive 
complementarity between e  and M , implying that the effort level increases when there are more teams; and if 
2 0e Mπ∂ /∂ ∂ = , there exists negative complementarity between e  and M  so that the effort level decreases when more 
teams work in parallel. The next lemma shows the sufficient condition for the Hessian matrix of the firm’s profit to be 
negative definite, leading to the further discussion on the complementarity between e  and M .  
 
Lemma 3.  The sufficient condition for the Hessian matrix of the firm’s profit to be negative definite with collaborative 
teams is that the following inequality holds at the stationary point ( )e M∗ ∗,   
 
( )
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )[1 ( ) (1 ( ))]
q M
q M q M ln e q M q M ln e
M
ρ ρ′ ′− − ≥ + − − .  (4) 
Proof. Please see Appendix E.   
 
Based on the above lemma, we first consider the case when 1 ( ) (1 ( )) 0q M ln eρ+ − ≤ . As proved in Appendix E, 
there always exists negative complementarity for this case between e  and M  and the above inequality (4) can be simplified 
as  
 
( )
1
( )
q M
q M M
≤ .
′
 
Secondly, when 1 ( ) (1 ( )) 0q M ln eρ+ − > , if  
 
( )
[1 2 ( ) (1 ( ))] [1 ( ) (1 ( ))]
( )
q M
q M ln e q M ln e
q M M
ρ ρ+ − ≤ < + − ,
′
 (5) 
there exists positive complementarity between e  and M , and if  
 
( )
[1 ( ) (1 ( ))] 1
( )
q M
q M ln e
q M M
ρ+ − < ≤ ,
′
 (6) 
there exists negative complementarity between e  and M .  
 
Finally, when there is no complementarity between the effort level e  and team size M , the Hessian matrix is always 
negative definite. In addition, the following equation always holds  
 
( )
[1 ( ) (1 ( ))]
( )
dM dq M
q M ln e
M q M
ρ= + − .  
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Since (1) 1q = , the relationship between the optimal effort level e∗  and the number of teams M ∗  can be solved as  
 
( ) 1( )(1 ( ))q MM q M eρ
∗∗ ∗ ∗ −= − .  (7) 
We define the term  
 
( )
( )
Mq M
q M
ψ
′
=  
as the team elasticity of collaboration which measures how the degree of collaboration changes when there is one more team 
in the collaborative structure. Notice that this team elasticity can be negative if the collaboration strength starts to decrease 
when more teams are in the group. The conditions for the stationary point ( )e M∗ ∗,  to achieve either positive, zero, or 
negative complementarity are summarized in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2. Complementarity conditions regarding the team elasticity of collaboration 
 
Having discussed the complementarity between e  and M  with respect to team elasticity of collaboration ψ , we next 
demonstrate the conditions for the firm to achieve a first-best solution.  
 
Proposition 2.  Under individual reward policy, the necessary and sufficient condition for both the firm’s optimal profit and 
the fixed wage payment to be positive is  
 
( )
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
I G
I G G G
M q M M
ln q M ln
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
′
≤ ≤ ,
− − − − − −
 
and the teams’ optimal effort level can be characterized as  
 
( ) 1( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
( )
q Mc e q M e B
e M
ρ
ρ
∗
∗ ∗
∗ −
∗ ∗
′
= − ,
′
 
which can be induced by offering the optimal reward as  
 
( )
( )( ) (1 ( ))
( )
(1 ( ))
q M
M
q M
I
e
c e e
r B
e M
e
ρ
ρ ρ
∗
∗
∗
∗ ∗
∗
∗ ∗
∗
′ −
= = .
,
−
 
Proof. Please see Appendix F.    
 
Proposition 2 demonstrates the conditions for the firm to obtain the first-best solution, which enables the firm to offer a 
positive fixed wage payment and still maintain a positive optimal profit. The condition essentially implies that under the 
individual reward policy, the necessary condition for both a firm’s optimal profit and the fixed wage payment to be positive 
is the existence of negative complementarity between e  and M . In other words, when the firm achieves the first-best 
solution, there should always exist the negative complementarity between the group size and effort level, i.e., when more 
teams join in the group, each team exerts less effort.  
 
When the conditions of obtaining the first-best solution cannot be satisfied, the firm may still achieve the second-best 
solution under certain condition, which is presented in the next proposition.  
 
Proposition 3.  Under the individual reward policy, the firm can only achieve the second-best solution by paying a zero wage 
payment if  
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( )
( ) (1 ) (1 )
I
I G
Mq M M
q M ln
ρ
ρ ρ
′
< ,
− − −
 
and the effort level and reward in this case can be determined from  
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
I
e
I
r
c e
r
e M
c e e M r U
ρ
ρ
′
= ,
,
= , − .
 
Proof. Please see Appendix G.    
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the iso-utility wage contours for teams between reward and the number of teams. In particular, for 
a fixed wage payment w  to achieve certain utility, there can be various combinations between r  andM , that is,  
 0
i
i
Iw
M M
Iw
r
dr
r
dM
ρ
ρ
∂
∂
∂
∂
= − = − < ,  
and 
2 2 0d r dM/ > . Hence, the substitution rate between r  and M  for a fixed wage monotonically decrease.  
 
 
Figure 2. Team’s iso-utility indifference curves for a fixed wage: first best 
 
The firm’s marginal indifference rate between r  and M  for a fixed profit is  
 
( )
( )
G I I G I e
M M e eM M
G I Ie
e er lr
B w r M r B M rdr
dM B M r M
π
π
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
∂
− − − + −
= − = − ,
− −
 
which will equal individual’s substitution rate at the point ( )M r∗ ∗,  that satisfies conditions  
 
( )
( )
G I
M r
G I
e e
B w r c e U
B M r Mc e
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
= + = + ,
′= = .
 
 
These two conditions are essentially the first-order conditions of the firm’s profit with respect to e  and M . If the 
optimal point ( )M r∗ ∗,  is within the region for team’s iso-utility contours with utility rU , as shown in Figure 2, then the 
first best solution can be achieved. However, if the optimal point ( )M r∗ ∗,  is out of the region for team’s iso-utility wage 
contours with utility rU  as shown in Figure 3, the firm has to move its indifference curve downward such that it is tangent 
with team’s iso-utility wage contour at 0w = . In this case, the firm has to bind team’s positive wage constraint and achieve 
a positive second-best profit.  
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Figure 3. Team’s iso-utility wage contours and firm’s indifference curve: second best 
 
Aggregate reward policy 
Instead of offering rewards to successful individual teams, the firm can equally reward all the teams when the research 
succeeds. We first demonstrate a similar symmetric equilibrium as that under individual reward policy. Under the aggregate 
reward policy, asymmetric equilibrium may exist where teams exert efforts at different levels. However, we finally 
demonstrate that only the symmetric equilibrium exist as long as all the teams in sub-teams collaborate as one team.  
 
If the firm employs aggregate reward policy for its parallel collaborative teams, similar symmetric equilibrium may exist 
as that under the individual reward policy. The next proposition shows that no such conditions exist for the firm to both offer 
a positive wage payment and achieve a positive profit.  
 
Proposition 4.  Under the symmetric equilibrium of aggregate reward policy, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
0w∗ ≥  (or, for the firm to be able to offer a positive fixed wage payment) is  
 
( )
( ) (1 ) (1 )
G
G G
q M M M
q M ln
ρ
ρ ρ
′
≥ ,
− − −
 
and the necessary and sufficient condition for the firm’s optimal profit to be positive is  
 
( )
( ) (1 ) (1 )
G
G G
q M M
q M ln
ρ
ρ ρ
′
≤ ,
− − −
 
and the effort level and aggregate reward in this case can be determined from  
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
G
e
G
r
R c e
M e M
R
c e e M U
M
ρ
ρ
′
= ,
,
= , − .
 
Proof. Please see Appendix H.    
 
Proposition 4 illustrates that it is impossible for the team elasticity of collaboration to satisfy both conditions as those for 
individual team reward policy. Hence, the firm cannot achieve a positive profit and offer a positive wage payment at the same 
time under the symmetric equilibrium of aggregate reward policy. Therefore, to achieve a positive profit under the symmetric 
equilibrium of aggregate reward policy, the firm should not offer a fixed wage payment to teams.  
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We next investigate the possible asymmetric equilibrium when there exist two or more sub-teams among parallel teams. 
We show that the optimal solution requires the firm to induce teams to exert efforts at the same level no matter how many 
sub-teams may exist.  
 
Proposition 5.  The asymmetric equilibrium does not exist when the firm offers the aggregate reward and all parallel teams 
collaborate as one team.  
Proof. Please see Appendix I.    
 
Proposition 5 implies that all the teams exert same effort levels as long as they enjoy the collaboration among all the 
participants. The solution in this case is the same as that under the symmetric equilibrium. If there hardly exists any 
collaboration among the sub-teams, then the group success rate will be different and there may exist asymmetric equilibrium 
among teams.  
 
Figure 4. Various conditions with respect to team elasticity of collaboration ψ  
Figure 4 graphically summarizes our findings about two types of reward policies with regard to the team elasticity of 
collaboration. According to our conditions in previous propositions, different areas are identified with respect to the team 
elasticity of collaboration. In addition, we add in collaboration and complementarity to the chart so that their relationship to 
the firm’s decision can be easily seen. Since there lacks collaboration in non-collaborative teams, the team elasticity of 
collaboration is 1 and the firm can achieve a positive profit, but cannot offer a positive wage payment to teams. When there 
exists no complementarity between team effort levels and the number of teams, it is possible to offer a positive wage 
payment to teams under both types of reward policies; however, the firm will not be able to achieve a positive profit under 
such situation. The shaded area represents the range of team elasticity of collaboration that enables the firm to achieve the 
first-best solution, both the firm’s optimal solution and the fixed wage payment are positive. Figure 4 also presents the 
comparison between individual and aggregate reward policy: the first-best solution may be obtained when the team elasticity 
of collaboration is within a certain range under individual reward policy, but only second-best solution can be achieved under 
aggregate reward policy.  
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The increasingly competitive market has forced companies to seek more cost-effective ways to engage in knowledge 
creation. The recent trend in outsourcing knowledge clearly indicates that companies are constantly searching for the best 
business strategy to not only save the costs but also improve the quality of knowledge discoveries.  
 
To derive important managerial insights about how to effectively employ parallel team strategies, we presented a model 
of parallel teams and incentives in which a firm employs multiple teams and designs incentives to motivate these teams to 
exert their best efforts. Our analysis provides valuable guidance for managers in deploying parallel teams as discussed below.  
First, motivating teams to effectively engage in knowledge creation is essential for firms to improve their productivity and 
overall performance. We show how appropriate incentives can be designed. Appropriate incentives (for instance, wage 
payments) can be designed to induce workers’ best efforts in knowledge innovation, enhancing the success rate of knowledge 
discovery.  
 
Second, collaboration is indispensable within parallel teams for knowledge creation to achieving maximal benefits. In 
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non-collaboration teams, the firm should not offer any fixed payment to a group of teams, but only offer the reward part that 
shares the knowledge creation benefit, since only the second-best solution is attainable.  
 
Third, successful innovation teams can be rewarded either individually or collectively. Although it is possible to achieve 
the first-best effort levels with the individual team reward policy, the incentive to motivate collaboration may not be so strong 
because only successful teams get the reward. In contrast, under the aggregate reward policy, teams will share the total 
reward as long as any team succeeds, so they may be induced to voluntarily collaborate with other teams.  
 
This study sheds light on how incentives and collaboration among teams affect organizational decisions on knowledge 
creation. We plan to study the uncertainty of innovation benefit with potential knowledge discovery and investigate the 
impacts of information technology in more detail. In conclusion, our paper provides valuable insights for managers to choose 
the best number of parallel teams for knowledge discovery and also determine appropriate level of rewards to achieve 
optimal organizational profits.  
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Appendix is omitted due to lack of space and is available at http://faculty.plattsburgh.edu/justin.zhang/Appendix_AMCIS2009.pdf. 
 
